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In 1873, 75 years before Karl Jaspers published his theory of the Axial Age in 1949, unknown  
to Jaspers and to contemporary scholars today, Scottish folklorist John Stuart Stuart-Glennie 
elaborated the first fully developed and nuanced theory of what he termed “the Moral Revolution” 
to characterize the historical shift emerging roughly around 600 BCE in a variety of civilizations, 
most notably ancient China, India, Judaism, and Greece, as part of a broader critical philosophy of 
history. He continued to write on the idea over decades in books and articles and also presented 
his ideas to the fledgling Sociological Society of London in 1905, which were published the 
following year in the volume Sociological Papers, Volume 2. This article discusses Stuart-Glennie’s 
ideas on the moral revolution in the context of his philosophy of history, including what he 
termed “panzooinism”; ideas with implications for contemporary debates in theory, comparative 
history, and sociology of religion. It shows why he should be acknowledged as the originator of 
the theory now known as the axial age, and also now be included as a significant sociologist in the 
movement toward the establishment of sociology. 
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Introduction: À la recherche de la théorie Perdu 
The sociological theory textbooks make it seem as though the early history of sociology 
is finished and formatted. But imagine coming across a prominent theory which was hid- 
ing in plain sight in early sociology discussions, by an author never credited with the 
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theory, and who seemed to drop off the face of the earth after his death in 1910. The 
theory concerns phenomena of interest to a much broader range of scholars than sociolo- 
gists. I have been lucky enough to discover just such a case and have now brought it to 
the light of day (Halton, 2014). 
Here, I wish to build upon that work by presenting additional materials for the claims 
that this author, John Stuart-Glennie (1841–1910), was the first person to articulate a 
fully developed and nuanced theory of what 75 years later became known as the axial 
age. I will show why he should also now be included as a significant sociologist in the 
movement toward the establishment of sociology, articulating theories in an explicitly 
sociological context which retain contemporary significance for discussions in theory, 
comparative history, and sociology of religion. I will be drawing from Stuart-Glennie 
materials I uncovered only after publishing my recent book, From the Axial Age to the 
Moral Revolution (Halton, 2014), in addition to his primary book from 1873, and 1906 
publication with the Sociological Society. 
In 1949, Karl Jaspers published his book, Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte 
(translated into English as The Origin and Goal of History) concerning what he called 
“the axial age.” He coined that term to characterize the historical shift emerging roughly 
around 600 BCE in a variety of civilizations, most notably ancient China, India, Israel, 
and Greece. He acknowledged Alfred Weber’s ideas and influence to some extent, but 
ultimately dismissed his sociological and material explanations of the phenomena in 
favor of a more speculative movement of the human spirit (Boy and Torpey, 2013). 
Jaspers (1953) claimed that he was the first to develop a full theory of the phenomenon, 
despite some earlier scholars such as Ernst von Lasaulx in 1856 and Viktor von Strauss in 
1870, who noted the facts, “but only marginally” (p. 9). And there were other earlier 
scholars who briefly noted the facts “marginally,” such as Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil- 
Duperron in 1771.1 Stuart-Glennie was not aware of these writings, just as Jaspers was not 
aware of Stuart-Glennie’s work. After a slow start, the idea reintroduced by Jaspers gradu- 
ally took off over the next decades, with discussions by Lewis Mumford in 1956 and Eric 
Voegelin in 1957, a special edition of the journal Dædalus (1975), two anthologies edited 
by Shmuel Eisenstadt and others in 1986 and 2005, and recently, one edited by Robert 
Bellah and Hans Joas in 2012. Bellah also published his magnum opus Religion in Human 
Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age in 2011. Although an intrinsically inter- 
disciplinary theory, the axial age idea found increasing sociological interest. 
Despite these decades of interest spanning more than half a century, the scholarship 
said nothing about the man who had first articulated a comprehensive and nuanced the- 
ory of the phenomenon in 1873, some 75 years before Jaspers’ book first appeared. 
Unknown to Jaspers, and all subsequent scholars except Lewis Mumford, John Stuart 
Stuart-Glennie, who was most widely known then as a folklorist but was also a philoso- 
pher of history, elaborated a fully developed theory of what he termed the moral revolu- 
tion to characterize the period, as part of a broader critical theory of history. His theory 
included gradations unexplored by Jaspers, such as a view of prehistory as panzooinist in 
outlook, a worldview of revering “all life” as a religious basis for conceiving nature, as I 
will describe later. It is set in the context of a comparative theory of history that gave 
great attention to material conditions, as well as to pre-axial folk cultures and civiliza- 
tions, both of which Jaspers undervalued or ignored. 
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Stuart-Glennie also presented these ideas in an explicitly sociological context in 1905, 
at the Sociological Society’s annual meeting in London. Stuart-Glennie’s contribution, 
“Sociological Studies,” was published in the new annual volume of the Sociological 
Society, Sociological Papers, Volume 2 (1906), whereas the drift to sociology of the 
concept of the axial age only began more than a half century later. Sociology, then still in 
the beginning stages of disciplinary formation, missed the opportunity to incorporate a 
major theory that would only begin to attract the attention of sociologists in the last dec- 
ades of the twentieth century. Hence, I claim sociology today needs to acknowledge 
Stuart-Glennie’s original contribution on the moral revolution from back then as part of 
its history until now neglected, and also to evaluate the place of Stuart-Glennie’s ideas 
for contemporary sociological debates in theory, comparative history, and sociology of 
religion. 
A longer analysis and discussion of Jaspers’ work is provided in my book on Stuart- 
Glennie (Halton, 2014). Given space limitations, I will here simply illustrate a brief 
comparison of some key statements from Jaspers on the axial age and Stuart-Glennie on 
the moral revolution, illustrated in Figure 1, where I have highlighted some of the 
similarities. 
As is evident in Figure 1, Stuart-Glennie states the facts as well as the moral and 
intellectual significance of the moral revolution – Jaspers’ Axial Age – contradicting 
Jaspers’ claim to have been the first to grasp them as a whole in an articulated theory. 
In the 1906 quotation from “Sociological Studies,” he lists the breakout of the moral 
revolution in the same order as Jaspers would later do in The Origin and Goal of 
History: China, India, Persia, Syria (Palestine), and Greece, although Stuart-Glennie 
adds Egypt and Italy to the mix. 
Stuart-Glennie’s characterization of the moral revolution explicitly drew attention to 
what he called its “prophetianism,” and presented a very different picture from Jaspers’ 
idealization of the period as the central pivot of all history. Some scholars, such as Robert 
Bellah (2011: 271), have tried to tease out whether Max Weber’s discussions of the rise of 
prophets were an influence on Jaspers, but Stuart-Glennie was already discussing the out- 
break and meaning of “prophetianism” in 1873 as a manifestation of the moral revolution: 
… we find the religions of this Age of a far more abstract character. They are also, though in 
one aspect certainly, great social growths, yet in such a way as we find no example of in the 
previous Age, founded by individual Moral Teachers, after whom these religions are called 
Buddhism, Christianism, and Mohammedanism. And hence we distinguish the Religion 
generally of this Second Age as Prophetianism. 
(Stuart-Glennie, 1873: 224) 
Note that Stuart-Glennie includes “Christianism” and “Mohammedanism” as mani- 
festations of the second age of humanity inaugurated by the moral revolution, despite 
their later emergence. 
Given Stuart-Glennie’s explicit attention to prophetianism as characteristic of the new 
religions decades before Weber wrote, the question of whether Weber’s discussion of the 
age of prophets was or was not a possible influence on Jaspers is rendered relatively 
unimportant in the broader history of the moral revolution/axial age. But the question 
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Karl Jaspers, 1949 (trans. 1953) 
“It would seem that this axis of history 
is to be found  in  the  period  around  
500 B.C., in the spiritual process that 
occurred between 800 and 200 B.C. It is 
there that we meet with the most deep cut 
dividing line in history. Man, as we know 
him today, came into being. For short we 
may style this the ‘Axial Period.’ 
The most extraordinary events are 
concentrated in this period. Confucius 
and Lao Tse were living in China, all the 
schools of Chinese philosophy came into 
being, including Mo-ti, Chuang-tse, Lieh- 
tsu, and a host of others; India produced 
Upanishads and Buddha and, like China, 
ran the whole gamut of philosophical 
possibilities down to skepticism, to 
materialism, sophism and nihilism; In 
Iran Zarathustra taught a challenging 
view of the world as a struggle between 
good and evil; in Palestine prophets 
made their appearance, from Elijah, by 
way of Isaiah and Jeremiah to Deutero- 
Isaiah; Greece witnessed the appearance 
of Homer, of the philosophers— 
Parmenides, Heraclitus and Plato—of the 
tragedians, Thucydides and Archimedes. 
Everything implied by these names 
developed during these few centuries 
almost simultaneously in China, India, 
and the West, without any one of these 
regions knowing the others” (1953, 3-4). 
“What is new about this age, in all three 
areas of the world, is that man becomes 
conscious of Being as a whole, of himself 
and his limitations. He asks radical 
questions. Face to face with the void he 
strives for liberation and redemption. By 
consciously recognizing his limits he sets 
himself the highest goals. He experiences 
absoluteness in the depths of selfhood 
and in the lucidity of transcendence. 
All this took place in reflection. 
Consciousness became once more 
conscious of itself In this age were born 
the fundamental categories within which 
we still think today, and the beginnings of 
the world religions, by which humans still 
live, were created” (1953, 2). 
Figure 1. Jaspers and Stuart-Glennie. 
John Stuart-Glennie, 1889 
“As I was the first to point out, and as I have again 
and again shown during the last fifteen years, the sixth 
century B.C. -more accurately the sixth-fifth century 
B.C. (550-450 B.C.)- is the true epoch of division
between the Ancient and Modern Civilisations. The 
sixth-fifth century before Christ was the century of 
Confucius in China; of Buddha in India; of Gomates 
and Zoroastrianism as a political power in Persia; of 
the Babylonian Captivity (588-536); the so-called 
second Isaiah and the triumph of Yahvehism, in Judea; 
of Psammetichus, its last Pharaoh, and of the worship 
of Isis and Horus, the divine Mother and Child, rather 
than of ‘Our Father,’ Osiris, in Egypt; of Thales, the 
Father of Philosophy; of Pythagoras and Xenophanes, 
the fathers also of Religious and Ethical Reform; and 
of Sappho and Alkaios, the first of the new subjective 
and lyric school of Poetry in Greece; and finally,  
in this rapid indication of its greater synchronisms, 
it was the century of that Persian world-empire of 
Kyros which, followed as it was by the Greek world- 
empire of Alexander, and the Roman world-empire of 
Caesar, established henceforth Aryan domination; it 
was the century in which Europe and Asia first appear 
as clearly differentiated; and it was the century of 
those political changes from Monarchies to Republics 
which were but the outward sign and seal of far 
profounder economic changes both in Greece and at 
Rome” (1889, 309, fn.1). 
Stuart-Glennie, 1906 
“Assyriological and Egyptological researches are 
more and more adding to our knowledge of the 
development of the earlier religions through the 
conflict between the primitive magical, or panzooist, 
and the new supernaturalist conception of Nature. 
The successive stages in this development cannot be, 
as yet, clearly distinguished. But one great epoch can 
be signalised—that which I was, I believe, the first, 
thirty-two years ago ([In the Morningland:] “New 
Philosophy of History,” 1873), to point out as having 
occurred in the sixth (or fifth-sixth) century B.C. in 
all the countries of civilisation from the Hoangho to 
the Tiber. There arose then, as revolts against the 
old religions of outward observance or custom, new 
religions of inward purification or conscience—in 
China, Confucianism; in India, Buddhism; in Persia, 
Zoroastrianism; in Syria, Yahvehism (as a religion 
of the people rather than merely of the prophets), 
and changes of a similar character in the religions 
also of Egypt, of Greece, and of Italy (1906, 262). 
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arises of what effects might Stuart-Glennie’s articulation of prophetianism and the moral 
revolution have had for Weber or Jaspers’ thinking had his ideas been incorporated into 
broader sociological consideration. 
The first citation by Stuart-Glennie in Figure 1 is taken from a footnote in his 1889 
article, “The Traditions of the Archaian White Races,” which I recently discovered and 
discuss for the first time here. In the article, he recapitulates his 1873 theory of the moral 
revolution in places, along with biblical exegeses, while attempting to justify a “scien- 
tific” racialist theory for the origins of civilization (an unfortunate preoccupation of 
Stuart-Glennie’s which I have described and criticized elsewhere and will return to). One 
notices in these brief quotations the explicit parallels between Jaspers’ and Stuart- 
Glennie’s depictions. Stuart-Glennie also delineated, from 1873 and on, the ways the 
moral revolution manifested in three domains: the intellectual, the religious, and the 
socio-political. In the quotations cited here, for example, he draws attention to socio- 
political domain in citing the Persian world empire started by Cyrus (Kyros) as well as 
Greek and Roman republics. He also notes the transformations from religions based on 
custom to new religions based on conscience. 
Stuart-Glennie’s mentions of the Babylonian Captivity, of Pythagoras and Cyrus, also 
indirectly allude to a kind of seldom acknowledged focal point in the moral revolution: 
Babylon. The question of whether Neo-Babylonians (like aspects of Egyptian religious 
culture also cited by Stuart-Glennie) can be considered elements of the moral revolution/ 
axial age has been debated with a general consensus that they should not (e.g. Machinist, 
1986: 183–202). The Neo-Babylonians clearly had more sophisticated mathematics and 
astronomy reaching far earlier than the Greeks, but didn’t “theorize” on it. But a number 
of experimental scientists today are primarily observational rather than theoretical: is it 
second-order reflective thought that matters, or is the proof in the pudding, so to speak, 
in the first-order numbers and predictable systems described. 
Greek mathematics and astronomy owed much to the Neo-Babylonians, and the 
philosopher and mathematician Pythagoras is described as having spent a few years 
in Babylon learning from the Magi. Earlier he had traveled to Egypt and spent a dec- 
ade or so there learning mathematics and astronomy as well as religious ideas, which 
remained an influence. Although details about Pythagoras’ philosophy are scant, 
could he represent a kind of “surfacing” of Babylonian and Egyptian movements that 
contributed to the birth of the moral revolution/axial age, such that more allowance be 
given to Mesopotamian and Egyptian ingredients? That is a question it seems to me 
that remains open today, especially given the legacy of the Judeans coming out of the 
second Babylonian exile, armed with Babylonian learning, including debates con- 
cerning monotheism and the Babylonian God Marduk, and needing to delineate in 
writing the new outlook that marks them as bearers of the moral revolution/axial age 
(Grabbe, 2004). 
Jan Assmann has proposed the very useful idea of “proto-axiality” to signify interme- 
diate stages rather than either/or distinctions (see also the discussion of varying standards 
for qualifying as axial or not in Boy and Torpey [2013]). But perhaps another way to 
view it is to see those Greek philosophers, such as Pythagoras, and the Judeans as stand- 
ing on the shoulders of Neo-Babylonian giants, so to speak, in ushering in the moral  
revolution. 
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The 1889 footnote cited in Figure 1 filled in details on the moral revolution from a 
sentence in the essay where Stuart-Glennie (1889) argued that the “Books of Moses … 
the Pentateuch, or rather Hexateuch” should be viewed as an expression of the moral 
revolution rather than an earlier epoch: 
Finally, I would point out what is too often forgotten, that the ‘Books of Moses’ can, as to form, 
literary, moral, and theological, be justly compared, not with Sacred Books composed 
millenniums before the Hebrew Scriptures, but only with the literatures contemporary with the 
Pentateuch, or rather Hexateuch, when it first assumed its present shape – that is to say, with the 
other literatures bearing the impress of that great Moral Revolution under the influence of 
which the Hexateuch was finally redacted, that great Moral Revolution of the Sixth Century 
B.C. which extended throughout all the countries of civilisation from the Hoang-ho and the
Ganges to the Nile and the Tiber.
(p. 309) 
In dating the Books of Moses to the sixth Century BCE, Stuart-Glennie saw the 
importance of comparison not with a literal chronology, vertically so to speak, but on the 
basis of “form, literary, moral, and theological,” with the movement of which it was an 
expression, horizontally, that is, “with the other literatures bearing the impress of that 
great Moral Revolution of the Sixth Century B.C.” This was perhaps similar to his men- 
tion of “the new subjective and lyrical school of poetry in Greece,” which was also an 
example of a new differentiation of subjective and objective realms as another character- 
istic of the moral revolution. 
In this sense, his theory of the moral revolution allowed a deduction for a comparative 
history. Although Stuart-Glennie was a philosopher of history, in that sense, like Jaspers, 
he was also a working folklorist, a practice that would be largely absorbed into anthro- 
pology in the twentieth century as disciplines formed. One must remember that there 
were no sharp lines between folklore, sociology, and anthropology in the late nineteenth 
century and turn into the twentieth, and as Bennett (1997) put it in a review of a history 
of folklore and anthropology by George Stocking, “Stocking, in fact, stresses that anthro- 
pologists with a ‘sociological’ bent ‘were more likely to be active within the Folk-Lore 
Society’ than the Anthropological Institute” (pp. 120–121). Consider too Stuart-Glennie’s 
(1906) own words from the 1906 Sociological Society publication: 
I submit that, whether the law of historical intellectual development which I have suggested, or 
what Comte dogmatically presented as a “grande loi philosophique,” more nearly approximates 
to a true description of historical facts, is a question, judgment on which must be pronounced 
– not by those who are ignorant of, or ignore, the immense recent increase of our sociological
knowledge; but by those who, like myself, have spent a life-time in sociological research.
(p. 300) 
He stated concerning his three-paper contribution: 
I shall thus, I trust, be excused for prefacing papers on what must be the core of sociology, a law 
of historical intellectual development, by a paper on the place of the social sciences in a 
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classification of knowledge, based on a fundamental theory of mind and matter. But a theory of 
mind and matter is, in other words, a theory of causation. 
(Stuart-Glennie, 1906: 291) 
Stuart-Glennie’s philosophy of history and depiction of the moral revolution was 
based on a theory of causation. Unlike Jaspers’ downplaying of material causes, prefer- 
ring to see the axial age as a movement of spirit, Stuart-Glennie saw in its rise “a slow 
and extraordinarily varied working out of the antagonisms latent in primitive concep- 
tions.” That is, as I shall discuss later, he saw “primitive” intuitions of nature as subjec- 
tively true, but clothed in false conceptions, an outlook he termed panzooinism. The 
development of history was a dialectical process, perhaps in Hegel’s sense though not 
deriving from Hegel’s philosophy, of the working out of that antagonism toward a reso- 
lution of true intuitions of nature clothed in true conceptions, a resolution that he thought 
would be brought about through science. The moral revolution, far from Jaspers’ concep- 
tion of the axial age as the pivot of all history, was a transitional phase in this process, 
one primarily concerned with the differentiation of the subjective and objective. That 
differentiation would bring forth a dialectical development, especially in the develop- 
ment of the West, between the naturalism of Greek science and the supernaturalism of 
the Abrahamic religions: 
This conflict has been a slow and extraordinarily varied working out of the antagonisms latent 
in primitive conceptions; yet not a merely futile conflict, but one the long aeon of which 
constituted in all its ages – from that which began in the eighth or ninth millennium B.C. to that 
present age which may be dated from the sixth century B.C. – a vast and complex transition to 
a generally truer conception of causation, and hence to greater power over nature. Thus the 
transitional stage which Hume wisely forbore, and Comte rashly ventured to characterise, is 
now presented as an aeon of such conflicts as it would be as grotesque to qualify, like Comte, 
as “metaphysical,” as to date, as he does, from the quatorzieme siècle of the Christian era. And 
the appeal here against Comte is to all that recently accumulated mass of Ethnographical, 
Assyriological, and Egyptological discoveries of which he could not, and his disciples will not, 
take account. The third clause of the law presents the latest, if not ultimate, conception of 
causation as, with clear definiteness, connected with the primitive conception; and as, in the 
complexity of its integration of the differentiations of the Transitional Aeon, illustrating that 
general law of thought which Dr. Stirling has called “The Secret of Hegel.” 
(Stuart-Glennie, 1906: 300–301) 
As a folklorist, philology was an essential tool for Stuart-Glennie, especially in some of 
his empirical work in the Balkans.2 He raised here and elsewhere the issue of inscription as 
indicative of the Jewish manifestation of the broader moral revolution, a point related to the 
questions of the influence of technological and intellectual innovations, as well as canoni- 
zation of texts, as crucial for the spread of “axialization” raised by Jan Assmann. 
Assmann (2012a) has argued against what could be called literary determinism as a 
cause of the axial age, in favor of “implications of writing” of certain qualities as signifi- 
cant, especially the establishment of a “cultural literacy,” in which cultural memories and 
innovations, such as history displacing myth, and canonization become central. He views 
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the period between 200 BCE and 200 CE as when those texts became canonical in those 
expressions, those “literatures bearing the impress of that great Moral Revolution,” as 
Stuart-Glennie put it. In Assmann’s (2012b) words, 
The decisive event is not the terrestrial existence of the great individuals but the canonization 
of their writings … Canonization … is not an individual but a social and collective process … 
If we insist on a first period of axialization, we could point to the years about 200 B.C.E. to 200 
CE when the great canons were established: the Confucian, the Daoist, and the Buddhist canons 
in the East, and the Avesta, the Hebrew bible and the canon of Greek “classics” in the West. 
This is not the time when Homo sapiens axialis, “the human being with whom we are still 
living,” came into being, but when the texts were canonized that we are still reading. 
(p. 399) 
In this connection, it was not simply literacy per se or the later canonization but novel 
forms of writing to which Stuart-Glennie drew attention, an interesting perspective to 
add to Assmann’s “implications of writing.” In his original 1873 statement, Stuart- 
Glennie (1873) noted the influence of technological and intellectual literary invention in 
the spread of the moral revolution in the period around the Sixth century BCE: 
Throughout the civilised world, in Japan (?), China, India, Persia, Judaea, Greece, and Egypt, 
we find a new intellectual activity in collecting, editing, and for the first time writing down in 
alphabetic characters the Literature of the preceding centuries. It is only in this century that a 
Profane, as distinguished from a Sacred Literature arises; only from this time forth that, 
speaking generally, we have independent and nameable individual authors; and only now that, 
in the speculations of Thales, philosophical, as distinguished from religious Speculation, 
begins. And further, it is to this century that is to be traced, in the down-writing of the Ormuzd- 
and-Ahriman Creed of the Persians and the new development of the Messiahism of the Jews, 
the first beginnings of general reflection on the Past, and speculation on the Future of Mankind; 
the first beginnings, therefore, of Universal, and Philosophical History; the first beginnings of 
such reflection and speculation as that with which we are ourselves now occupied. 
(pp. 212–214) 
Clearly, the rise of reflective mind is significant, a key point also from Jaspers on. And 
in a footnote to this statement, 
This is clear with respect to China, India, Persia, and Greece … In Judaea, however, and in 
Egypt, we find partial exceptions to this generalisation. For though by far the greater part of the 
Hebrew Literature owes, if not its substance to writers, at least its form, to editors of the Sixth 
and later centuries; still, certain prophecies, those at least of Joel and of Amos, would appear 
not only in their present shape to belong to, but to have been written by nameable authors of the 
eighth or ninth century. See Davidson, Introduction to Old Testament (1862), and compare 
Ewald. As to Egypt the exception lies in this, that we have hieroglyphic and hieratic Papyri of 
an immensely earlier date. But the generalisation still holds in this, that it is only to the Sixth 
Century that the demotic or popular form of writing can be traced. 
(Stuart-Glennie, 1873: 213) 
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Stuart-Glennie noted ways in which Egypt contributed new cultural expressions 
indicative of the moral revolution, such as the development of popular writing, or earlier, 
the near outbreak of monotheism with Akhenaten. He also admitted that Egypt did not 
provide a clear example of a thorough transformation to the moral revolution, consistent 
with the consensus of later scholarship. 
The mistaken origins of civilization 
Stuart-Glennie, though a socialist and advocate for worker rights, sought a racial under- 
standing of the origins of civilization, which needs to be addressed. He attempted to under- 
stand the division of labor in early civilization as a result of lighter skinned races dominating 
darker ones, which allowed the dominators the leisure to develop the arts, crafts, and sci- 
ences that emerged with civilizations. He claimed biological support for the superiority of 
lighter skinned races, which, despite the widespread scientific racism, was already a matter 
of contention in biology and anthropology debates of the time, eventually to be rejected in 
the first decades of the twentieth century through works, for example, of Boas and others. 
As Stuart-Glennie (1892) put it in an 1892 essay on the “Origins of Mythology,” 
Innumerable Human Societies exist, and have always existed, which are no more distinguished 
by progress than are Animal Societies. Why? The answer I would suggest is, that these Human 
Societies are no more distinguished than are Animal Societies by that Conflict of Higher and 
Lower Races, which, through the subjection of the Lower Races, gives the Higher Races 
wealth, and hence leisure and opportunity for the development of those higher intellectual 
capacities which would otherwise lie dormant – gives leisure and opportunity, in a word, for 
that development of Thought which is the core and cause of progressive history. 
(p. 218) 
Although a socialist, Stuart-Glennie was not persuaded by Marx and Engels’ claims 
for class differentiation rather than race in early civilized societies as a basis for domina- 
tion, although he did admit it as a later development. He defined civilization in his 1905 
papers for the Sociological Society as 
Civilisation is such a relation between higher and lower races (or, at a later period, classes of 
the same race) as results in enforced organisation of food-production and -distribution, 
followed by such economic conditions as make possible the planning and execution of great 
public works, the invention and development of phonetic writing, and the initiation of 
intellectual development generally. But as civilised and progressive societies began, they 
maintained themselves, through the conflict not only of races (or classes), but of ideas. 
Assyriological and Egyptological researches are more and more adding to our knowledge of the 
development of the earlier religions through the conflict between the primitive magical, or 
panzoist, and the new supernaturalist conception of Nature. 
(Stuart-Glennie, 1906: 261–262) 
Contrary to Stuart-Glennie’s origins of civilization thesis, the establishment of bureau- 
cratic elites and increases in inequality appear in the emergence of all agriculturally based 
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civilizations, including those established in the new world, regardless of racial differences or 
racial homogeneity. If Stuart-Glennie had not been so stubbornly fixated on the widespread 
“scientific” racism of his time, and had been able to see class differentiation rather than 
racial origins as key, and that the differentiation into dominating and subordinate classes was 
a product rather than producer of civilizing processes, resulting from systemic conditions of 
domestication, agriculture, and settlement, including rapidly expanding populations and 
increasing hierarchical organization, he would have been on much sounder ground. 
Stuart-Glennie (1901: 454) thought that pre-civilized societies had less leisure, yet the 
actual archaeological and anthropological records that began to emerge in the late 1960s 
reveal clearly that foraging societies have more leisure and better nutrition than agricul- 
turally based civilized ones on average, and that what agriculturally based civilization 
did was to siphon off leisure and higher quality nutrition for the tiny elite, while the mass 
of people worked much harder and ate less well. Average heights in civilized societies, 
old world as well as new, fall 4–6 inches from the reduction of a wide variety of food 
sources from foraging to dependence on limited grains, such as wheat, barley, or rice (see 
Eaton et al., 1988; Lee and DeVore, 1968; Mummert et al., 2011; Sahlins, 1973). 
In his 1901 essay, “The Law of Historical Intellectual Development,” Stuart-Glennie 
(1901) also asked, “And how could individuals of a homogenous race have had the 
authority permanently to impose on others of the same race the sacrifices required by 
such labor and restraint?” (p. 454). He seemed to think that only difference could make 
the difference for the origins of civilization, neglecting how differentiation within a 
homogeneous group could accomplish the same purpose. The inventions of priestly class 
and of divine kinship, as Lewis Mumford (1967, 1970) pointed out, provided means of 
legitimating the harsher conditions required by agricultural civilization. The Babylonian 
myth of creation, the Atrahasis, illustrates how the portrayal of struggle among the gods, 
mythically mirroring the increased workload of civilized society, was solved by the crea- 
tion of humans to do the work of the gods, thereby legitimating the harsh conditions as 
religious service. 
It is odd that Stuart-Glennie failed to see how religious legitimation, backed by mili- 
tary muscle, could empower the emergent elite domination of laboring classes, espe- 
cially since he was aware of how the process worked, only applying it to race. If one 
simply substitutes “class” for “race” in his work, he would have given a good explana- 
tion of how dominating power legitimized itself through state religion: 
… it can hardly, I think, be doubted that one very potent cause of the development of homely 
supernal, into stately supernatural, beings, worshipped in elaborate and grandly spectacular 
rites was the need, the very practical and pressing need of cultivating every germ of the 
emotions of reverence, awe, and fear, in order to the due subordination and discipline of the 
lower races. 
(Stuart-Glennie, 1906: 261) 
The rise of supernatural beings and of what he called the rise of “Hell religions” is shown 
to be an aspect of dominating bureaucratic legitimation, religio-cultural components of 
the bureaucratic machine. 
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Figure 2. Enduring significance of religious ideas from different ages. 
Jaspers, with the racism of National Socialism discredited in postwar Europe, was not 
subject to the same racialist prejudices that marked Stuart-Glennie’s much earlier theory. 
But he held strong prejudices of his own. He completely discounted the spiritual views 
of non-civilizational peoples as insignificant, stating, “We see the vast territories of 
Northern Asia, Africa, and America, which were inhabited by men but saw the birth of 
nothing of importance to the history of the spirit” (Jaspers, 1953: 22). Jaspers drew from 
German anthropology, which was biologically based and at the time had little interest in 
ethnography. He seemed unaware of the vast body of ethnographies that had been done 
over many decades, from which, for example, Durkheim and Stuart-Glennie had drawn, 
and did not offer any convincing evidence for claiming “nothing of importance for the 
history of spirit.” And he denied much enduring significance to pre-axial civilizational 
beliefs, calling them “little islands of light” (Jaspers, 1954: 98) in comparison with the 
great breakthrough of reflective consciousness in axial age religions and philosophies 
(see Figure 2). 
Stuart-Glennie, by contrast, provided a historical account that accorded great signifi- 
cance to non-civilizational beliefs, linking them with modern science while viewing the 
moral revolution as a transitional phase. Although Stuart-Glennie’s racialist account of the 
origins of civilization was false, his broader philosophy of history allowed more to the 
spiritual outlook of indigenous peoples than Jaspers, as well as a more nuanced dialectical 
historical process stemming out of the moral revolution all the way to his present day. 
Stuart-Glennie’s theory of panzooinism, in allowing religion as involving perceptive 
relations to nature, attributes reality to non-civilizational folk beliefs as true intuitions of 
nature, albeit clothed in false conceptions, which would find completion in verified 
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conceptions of modern science. This theory has much to contribute to contemporary 
debates in the social sciences and philosophy concerning the legitimacy of “the new 
animism” (Harvey, 2005; Halton, 2005, 2007). 
And he viewed the moral revolution/axial age, by contrast with panzooinism and with 
Jaspers’ view of it as pivotal, as a transitional phase. Although significant, he argued that 
it had lost the true perceptive intuition of nature in the turn to the transcendent “super- 
naturalist” conceptions of divinity. In sum, although Stuart-Glennie’s racialist theory of 
the origins of civilization is false and must be rejected, it does not diminish the signifi- 
cance of his original theory of the moral revolution and its relevance today, or his under- 
standing of the subjective validity of panzooinism. 
Panzooinism, the moral revolution, and the United States 
of Europe 
As a philosopher of history, socialist, and folklorist, Stuart-Glennie developed a philoso- 
phy of history in contrast not only to Jaspers but also to Comte’s three-stage view of 
history as originating in superstition and culminating in science. Comte(1988 [1830] ) 
argued that the first, theological state represents phenomena “as being produced by the 
direct and continuous action of more or less numerous supernatural agents, whose arbi- 
trary intervention explains all the apparent anomalies of the universe” . From there, 
human intelligence passed through the metaphysical state, arriving at the state of positive 
science, “its fixed and definitive state.” He included in the first state all religions up to 
and including monotheism. By contrast, Stuart-Glennie viewed aboriginal and earliest 
civilizational religions as a first stage of “panzooinism,” or what he sometimes called 
“naturianism,” and as based in true intuitions of nature, though clothed in false concep- 
tions, rather than “arbitrary intervention” of supernatural beings. Panzooinism is a 
worldview centered in circumambient life, an outlook commonly called animism today, 
but as I will discuss below, distinguished for theoretical reasons by Stuart-Glennie from 
Tylor’s original definition of animism. 
Stuart-Glennie distinguished between “supernal beings,” as the intuitive personifica- 
tions of nature of the first stage, from supernatural beings and states, which represent 
religions of hierarchical civilization as well as the later movements from immanence 
toward transcendence characterizing the moral revolution, including, for example, mon- 
otheism and Greek logos. Despite his false racial presumptions, he did see clearly how 
civilization also introduced profound transformations of spiritual views, which corre- 
sponded to hierarchical organization. The moral revolution marks Stuart-Glennie’s sec- 
ond stage of humanity. He also drew attention to a greater degree of panzooinism and the 
significance of nature remaining in the Eastern manifestations of the moral revolution, 
such as Daoism, a nuance missing in Jaspers. One might take this perhaps as ethnocentric 
“orientalism,” although it does not seem to me to be Stuart-Glennie’s intent: far from it. 
Stuart-Glennie saw clearly that China and India were major centers of the moral revo- 
lution, and it should be remembered that panzooinism has a closer connection, through 
subjective intuitions, to the truth than less panzooinist manifestations of the moral revo- 
lution, a still remaining greater place for the wild other and its informing properties in 
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worldview. The example of Daoism allows that panzooinist influence, although refracted 
through the reflective lens of the moral revolution. Discussing the anthology tradition- 
ally attributed to Chuang-tzu, Komjathy (2011) states, 
Within the contours of the Zhuangzi, we find diverse views of animals, but there is a recurring 
engagement with and reverence for their innate connection with the Dao (the Way). This 
includes a critique of the human tendency to distort that connection through domestication and 
instrumentalism. The classical and foundational Daoist worldview is thus more theocentric 
(Dao-centered) and cosmocentric and less anthropocentric. One also occasionally finds 
expressed a quasi-ecological and conservationist perspective. Generally speaking, Daoist views 
and practices tend to be more body-affirming and world-affirming than other “world religions,” 
and this tendency includes a recognition of the cosmos, world, and all beings as manifestations 
of the Dao, at least in potentiality. Here one finds expressed a monistic, panenhenic and perhaps 
animistic theological view. That is, the Dao is simultaneously manifested as a single impersonal 
reality, as Nature itself, and as animating forces (“nature gods”) within Nature … one of the 
most radical Daoist perspectives is also one of the most authoritative and influential: it is the 
one found in the Zhuangzi, wherein animals are viewed as embodiments of the Dao and as 
potential teachers of humans. 
(no page) 
In his 1873 work, In the Morningland, Stuart-Glennie criticized Tylor’s definition of 
animism, published only 2 years earlier in his book Primitive Culture (1871), and claimed 
Tylor should have termed his theory “spiritism,” because of its idea of an animating 
principle from without, a “phantom.” Stuart-Glennie’s panzooinism, by contrast, took 
the conception of immanence of power in Nature itself, of the livingness of things, them- 
selves regarded as powers, as a more basic and accurate way to portray “primitive” folk 
or aboriginal beliefs as well as early civilizational polytheisms. As he put it in 1906, 
The fundamental implication of this conception is that of inherency of power in Nature itself. 
This implication there is also both in the panzoism of folk-religions and the pantheism of 
culture – religions. The fundamental conceptions, therefore, of science find no such antagonism 
in the Eastern pantheistic and atheistic religions as they have found, and of the most 
remorselessly persecuting character, in Western Christianity. Hence the triumph of scientific 
conceptions might appear to be the certain result of the present epoch of Asian-European 
conflict. But … we have no assurance that, as in the fall of the Roman Empire and the triumph 
of Christianism, there will not again be a victory of all lower elements. 
(Stuart-Glennie, 1906: 278) 
This view allowed the possibility of a perceptive relation to the informing properties 
of the livingness of things as a basis of religious and social life, of religion and social life 
as rooted in habitat relations. And as the previous quotation makes clear, he viewed mod- 
ern science as moving toward true intuitions of nature clothed in true conceptions. In that 
he was a progressivist, as was Comte. But he distinguished his philosophy of history 
from Comte’s, stating in his 1906 essay, 
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First, my standpoint is wholly different, not only philosophically, but historically from Comte’s: 
philosophically, it is a theory of causation very different (as indicated in my first paper) from 
Comte’s, the crudeness of which Mr. Mill himself was among the first to point out; and 
historically, it is a standpoint no less different in taking such a survey of intellectual development 
as only the results of research since Comte’s time have made possible. Secondly, I define and 
contrast, yet connect, the primitive and ultimate conceptions of causation – the panzoist and 
kosmianist stages, as I call them – in, as I submit, a more definite and more verifiable way than 
Comte – namely, as the former an unquantified intuition, and the latter a quantified conception 
of universal interaction. And thirdly, dating the commencement of the great Transitional Æon 
from the origin of civilisation instead of, as Comte did, from the fourteenth century, B.C., I 
define it by no such epithets as either “metaphysical” or “abstractional,” but as a succession of 
ages of Conflicts of Ideas developing the antagonisms latent in primitive or panzoist conceptions 
of sentient powers and supernal beings, and working up, through these conflicts of ideas, more 
and more definitely distinguishable as naturalist and supernaturalist, to those more verifiable 
conceptions which may be regarded as relatively ultimate, and designated kosmianist. 
(Stuart-Glennie, 1906: 301–302) 
Stuart-Glennie notes here in 1906 how the earliest panzooinist and yet to fully emerge 
scientifically informed “kosmianist” stages are linked by conceptions of causality, in 
contrast to Comte’s claim for a movement from arbitrary ideas to positive science. The 
kosmianist stage is for Stuart-Glennie the third age of humankind only then beginning to 
show its outlines, wherein intellectual, religious, and socio-political domains are purified 
through the developments of science. As he already put it in 1873, 
working up to such an integration as will, in the variously outwrought conception of mutual 
determination, mark that third age of humanity, towards the opening of which, in the 
establishment of new syntheses, philosophical, religious and social, we should seem to be 
approaching. 
(Stuart-Glennie, 1873: 223) 
Stuart-Glennie’s conception of the origins of science is also noteworthy. In contrast to 
a number of epistemological views which argue for scientific thinking as a conceptual 
practice, some even requiring the theoretically reflective advent of Greek science as a 
standard, Stuart-Glennie (1906) allows for a kind of “grass roots” origins in panzooinist 
intuitions, unquantified in contrast to modern scientific quantified conceptions: 
The facts I have generalised in the first clause of the law I have stated appear to show that 
scientific thinking originated in a primitive intuition of universal interaction, and that the germ 
from which gods were developed were the supernals, the creation of primitive poetry … But 
again, how is the primitive panzoist conception to be distinguished from, yet connected with, 
the scientific conception of reciprocal action? And how are the panzoist to be distinguished 
from, yet connected with, the kosmianist creations of supernal beings? The inferences from the 
facts referred to in the third clause of the law stated distinguish panzoist from kosmian 
conceptions of reciprocal action as the former unquantified, the latter quantified; and distinguish 
the supernal beings created by panzoist from those created by kosmianist poetry, as the former 
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unrecognisedly and the latter recognisedly subjective merely; and the law of the passage from 
the former to the latter set of conceptions and creations is verified in the conflicts of the 
transitional aeon of civilization … in the development of the sciences, the result of the conflict 
between naturalism and supernaturalism, the necessary stage of the creation of hypotheses, less 
and less crude and unverifiable as knowledge has increased, would be more correctly termed 
the hypothetical, than the “metaphysical,” stage. 
(p. 303) 
Stuart-Glennie’s philosophy of history was a nuanced dialectic, from the first age of 
panzooinism, to the second and transitional age of the conflict between naturalism and 
supernaturalism arising out of the moral revolution, marked especially in the West 
between the contradictions of naturalistic Greek science and Judeo-Christian supernatu- 
ralism, to the third age of kosmianism. This dialectic was marked by 500-year phases, 
culminating in the victory of the kosmian age by 2000. Here is another summary state- 
ment by Stuart-Glennie (1901), from his 1901 essay: 
In an historical survey of intellectual development since the origin of civilization, stages are 
presented in the past, and a stage may be inferred in the future thus characterizable: a first stage, 
marked by the incipient development, in sub-stages, hereafter to be distinguished, of the 
antagonisms latent in primitive panzoist conceptions, and progressively manifest in the history 
of nature-religions or naturianism; a second stage, initiated by the new moral religions of the 
sixth century B. C, and their concomitant changes, and marked, in the West particularly, by the 
definite differentiation and determined conflict of the naturalist and supernaturalist conceptions 
incipient only in the first stage; and a third stage marked by the victory of a more adequate 
naturalism in a kosmianism distinguished by verified conceptions of a quantitatively determined 
(instead of, as primitively, quantitatively undetermined) universal interaction; and by at once 
nobler and more verifiable ideals than either the earlier supernal, or later supernatural, beings 
and their abodes. 
(p. 459) 
The advent of the moral revolution marked the rise of what he called the supernatural 
religions: 
The new religions, on the other hand, of Western Asia and Europe, the Yahvehism of the sixth 
century B.c.; the Christianism of half a millennium later; and the Islamism after another half 
millennium, were, for the first time, supernatural religions, not in their popular forms only, but 
in their essential principle, the conception, not of a Power immanent in, but of a Creator 
independent of, Nature. 
(Stuart-Glennie, 1873: 262–263) 
Given the changes from state religions toward religions of the people, as in the reli- 
gions of the book cited by Stuart-Glennie, it is notable that supernaturalism, manifest in 
monotheism, still retains in transposed form the hierarchism, or what Morris Berman 
(2000) has called “the sacred authority complex,” inherent in earlier polytheistic state 
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Figure 3. Stuart-Glennie’s history of religion. 
religions. Perhaps that could be a factor in why, although beginning as marginal counter- 
cultures to centralized power, religions such as Christianity could become fused to power 
complexes, as happened in the Roman Empire. 
Stuart-Glennie believed the dialectic of 500-year phases between naturalism and 
supernaturalism would be resolved in favor of science, resulting in a religion of human- 
ism by the twenty-first century (see Figure 3). Rather than dissolving religion, as in 
Comte, science would purify it, as he stated in the quotation above, in “a more adequate 
naturalism in a kosmianism.” He saw the possibilities of science as, in a sense, a comple- 
tion of panzooinism, correcting its one-sidedness, as he called it. What has happened is, 
of course, far more complicated than his optimism allowed. The birth of the atomic age, 
signaled in the atomic bomb, brought a darker power culture of science into being, as 
both Jaspers and Mumford were among the very first thinkers to point out, far removed 
from the enlightened humanistic age Stuart-Glennie envisioned. Yet, there are perhaps 
some similarities to Jaspers’ view of the future of religion as allowing for greater human- 
istic outlook, although Jaspers still held for the enduring place of the axial. 
One of the earliest commentators on the axial theme, Lewis Mumford, was also oddly 
largely excluded from the scholarly debates on the axial age, despite being a well-known 
public intellectual. Mumford could also be considered a sociologist, having served as edi- 
tor of The Sociological Review in 1920, but has also been sorely neglected by sociologists, 
despite his numerous writings on cities, technology, history, and human development. He 
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devoted a chapter to “Axial Man” in his 1956 book The Transformations of Man, before 
sociologists expressed interest in the theme, and cites Stuart-Glennie as a forerunner. 
Mumford knew this because he had been brought to London by Patrick Geddes, who had 
been a friend of Stuart-Glennie and had written his obituary, to serve as editor of The 
Sociological Review. The Sociological Review was founded as a continuation of the 
annual volumes published as Sociological Papers, to which Stuart-Glennie had contrib- 
uted his discussions of the moral revolution, “Sociological Studies,” in Volume 2 in 1906. 
Mumford’s theory of the modern world, expressed, for example, in The Myth of the 
Machine (1967–1970), is independent of academic sociology’s Parsonian canon of the 
time, and can even be taken as an anti-Parsonian alternative. In its two volumes, he 
presents a more developed chronological account of human development than he did in 
The Transformations of Man (1956). It includes further critical discussions of the axial 
age, and again cites Stuart-Glennie (mistakenly as “Glennie”) as a forerunner, though 
again, without discussion of any details of Stuart-Glennie’s theory of the moral revolu- 
tion. Mumford (1970) does note that despite Stuart-Glennie’s “overelaborated terminol- 
ogy, he was the first to invent such necessary terms as ‘mechanotechnic’and ‘biotechnic’” 
(p. 448). 
With his serious interest in proper terminology, Stuart-Glennie was also critical of the 
term sociology, coined by Comte, not only because of its “barbaric mongrelism” in com- 
bining Latin and Greek but also because he thought its use was already too vague to be 
valid as scientific terminology. Nevertheless, as he put it in “The Place of the Social  
Sciences in a Classification of Knowledges,” Part 1 of his contribution to the 1906 
Sociological Papers volume, he allowed that “it may still desirably live, not only to 
serve, in Mr. Branford’s words, ‘the vague purposes of popular usage’, but that definitely 
twofold purpose of our Sociological Society which he has so admirably defined in the 
terms above cited” (Stuart-Glennie, 1906: 252).3 
Stuart-Glennie (1879) discussed the legacy of the moral revolution as involved in “the 
modern revolution” developing through the conflicted dialectic between Greek science 
and Christian ideals, the dialectic framed in 500-year periods of history. Whether or not 
his 500-year cycle model is sound – Charles Peirce also proposed such a view, and 
Mumford suggested that 600-year cycles might be more accurate – it did lead Stuart- 
Glennie to make an uncanny prediction in 1906 that this dialectic would involve likely 
transformations for the twentieth century, such as a Russian revolution, and a war 
between Russia and Germany that would lead to a “United States of Europe” by the year 
2000. Rather than socialism developing out of a heavily industrialized nation, Russian 
expansionism would lead the way: 
And vaguely as has hitherto loomed on the political horizon a general European, and therefore 
world-wide, war, its fatality will assume very definite outlines if we consider the probable 
consequences of the already achieved results of this sixth European-Asian conflict. Defeated in 
Further Asia by Japan, and encountered on the British Indian Frontier not only by a re-organised 
Army, but by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the aims of Russian Foreign Policy will be redirected 
to the realization of Pan-Slavic dreams of unification. The Tsardom, however, will probably 
first be transformed or overthrown. For Russia will probably begin the new European 
Revolution as France began the last, more than a century ago. Sooner or later these Russian 
National aims will come into conflict with German Imperial ambitions. And the way will thus 
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be prepared for that general Nationalist and Socialist Revolution which will create the United 
States of Europe. 
(Stuart-Glennie, 1906: 275) 
Stuart-Glennie’s extraordinary prediction got a lot right. Yet, “the new European  
Revolution” he outlined materialized far more darkly than Stuart-Glennie imagined, man- 
ifesting as the totalitarian Soviet Union and National Socialism of Nazi Germany, the 
massive deaths their conflict in World War 2 involved, and the divided Europe of the half 
century cold war which was its legacy.4 A “United States of Europe” did come into being 
in the form of the European Union (EU), and within the time frame Stuart-Glennie imag- 
ined. Although, ironically perhaps, Russia remains outside the EU today, its “Pan-Slavic 
dreams of unification” are rearing up again. And questions concerning the continuation of 
the EU itself have begun to emerge with the vote by the United Kingdom to exit. 
Conclusion 
Stuart-Glennie, Mumford, and Jaspers each developed comparative theories of history of 
profound import for sociology, delineating themes ranging not only from pre-civilized 
“panzooinist” religious outlooks and the emergence of the moral revolution/axial age, 
but addressing the meaning of those historical shifts for the modern world. Yet, they 
remain marginal at best or absent from sociological discussions of “comparative his- 
tory.” Jaspers, for example, is cited only once in the 2005 edited volume on comparative 
history, Remaking Modernity: Politics, History, and Sociology, in a footnote in Philip S. 
Gorski’s chapter, and there is no mention of Mumford in the book. Gorski (2005) sug- 
gested that Jaspers’ axial age theory provides a broader understanding of Max Weber’s 
discussions of “Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions,” as indicating a 
collapse of the axial age synthesis. Throwing Mumford and Stuart-Glennie into the mix 
would broaden the perspective for comparative history much further again, perhaps even 
to the point where Weber becomes the footnote on this theme. 
John Stuart-Glennie and Lewis Mumford each contributed major dimensions missing 
from Jaspers’ theory of the axial age.5 Although Jaspers has perhaps played an increasing 
role in sociological discussions concerning history, all of them, including Jaspers, 
deserve more attention than they have been given. Why these major thinkers remain 
occluded from the discipline of sociology (and the sub-discipline of historical sociology, 
a sub-discipline that is, after all, supposed to be actively concerned about history) sug- 
gests how important it is for sociologists to remain open to “unheard voices,” and closed 
to the canonizing text book mentality of accepted ideas. 
Stuart-Glennie’s theory of the moral revolution and understanding of the panzooinist 
outlook as characterizing aboriginal worldviews have much to add to contemporary dis- 
cussions of the axial age as well as key debates in theory, comparative history, and the 
sociology of religion. By grounding the moral revolution in a larger three-part philoso- 
phy of history, Stuart-Glennie opens the scope of the axial age debate. His idea that 
religion is rooted in perceptive relations to habitat “terrestrial conditions” provides an 
alternative to traditional understandings of animism as originally expressed by Tylor, but 
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also, for example, to Durkheim’s conceptualist idea of religion as human sociality pro- 
jected onto nature rather than a transaction with nature. 
Panzooinism as habitat relation is an insight that goes directly to contemporary 
debates on “the new animism” (Harvey, 2005: xi) as a relational ontology (Bird-David, 
2000; Ingold, 2011) rather than animism as attributes ascribed to substances. Things can 
speak not simply as isolate substances, but as signs living in our relations to them, poten- 
tial learning relationships worthy of our attention and respect. Stuart-Glennie’s scientific 
progressivism would seem to be at odds with some of the contemporary discussions, yet 
provides an interesting historical context on the movement away from perceptive pan- 
zooinism toward supernaturalism often missing from these debates. 
Despite the “marginal” insights into the synchronicities by the earliest commentators, 
which should be given greater exposition, it is clear that the history of the theory known 
thus far as the axial age needs to be rewritten, and that John Stuart-Glennie needs to be 
credited as the originator. His theory of the moral revolution also has the advantage that 
it does not make the moral revolution the key pivot of all history, as Jaspers claimed for 
the “axial” age. It attempted to ground the outlook in the material conditions of social 
life, though not always successfully, as in his assertion of racial origins of civilization. 
Still, his ideas were far ahead of their time, and now, more than a hundred years later, it 
is time for sociology to acknowledge the opportunity it missed in 1906, when Stuart- 
Glennie’s last major discussion of the moral revolution appeared within the pages of 
Sociological Papers, providing a historically informed, sociologically grounded theory 
of the moral revolution decades before Jaspers’ theory of the axial age or Alfred Weber’s 
ideas on the phenomena. That neglect was to the detriment of sociology’s historical and 
global imagination, and it is time to fix it. 
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Notes 
1. Anquetil-Duperron did not develop a full theory of the phenomenon, but only a mention of 
the synchronicity as significant. As I noted elsewhere (Halton, 2014), Johann P. Arnason
commented on this “prehistory” of the moral revolution/axial age theory, including Anquetil-
Duperron: “Its history would thus be comparable to the notion of civilizations in the plu-  
ral: both go back to marginal eighteenth-century intuitions that are later developed into
fully-fledged concepts” Johann Arnason, “The Axial Age and Its Interpreters: Reopening a
Debate.” In Axial Civilizations and World History. Edited by J. P. Arnason, S. N. Eisenstadt,
and B. Wittrock, 19. (Leiden, NLD: Brill Academic Publishers, 2005), 21. Although such pre- 
decessors are important to the history of the theory, such a discussion is beyond the scope of
this article. Stuart-Glennie did not appear to know of these earlier writers, stating repeatedly
that he was the first to provide a comprehensive historical theory of the phenomena.
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2. Stuart-Glennie was aware of the work of fellow Aberdeen biblical scholar and philologist
William Robertson Smith (1846–1894) and cited it in the essay from which this quotation is 
taken. It would be interesting to know whether they corresponded on Stuart-Glennie’s theory
of the moral revolution, given that Smith also developed a comprehensive account for the
origins of Semitic civilization, for example, in his book, The Religion of the Semites, also
published in 1889.
3. Stuart-Glennie (1906) proposed instead the terms anthropology and dikaiosynics:
there is in the undifferentiated popular conception of sociology, a notion, more or less
clear, of such a utilization of knowledge as may ameliorate social conditions. But in a far 
more definite and systematic manner will this idea be realized when sociology, as popu- 
larly conceived, has differentiated into an evolutional science, an anthropology, aiming at 
and discovering the laws of man’s history, and an ethical science, a dikaiosynics, as I have 
termed it, aiming at and discovering the conditions of just institutions. 
(p. 253) 
In the previous volume published a year earlier, Stuart-Glennie (1905) had raised a similar 
objection in responding to a paper by Durkheim, stating, 
Surely it would be desirable with less vagueness to define both Anthropology and Sociology 
(or, as I should rather say, Politology) by restricting the connotation of the former term to 
the Causal, and the other to the corresponding Applied, general science of Man. 
(p. 234) 
4. Stuart-Glennie’s statement from the 1905 Sociological Society meeting, published in 1906,
reminds one of another original historian’s prophetic insight from 1905, Henry Adams (1938),
who wrote in a letter to Henry Osborn Taylor:
The assumption of unity which was the mark of human thoughts in the middle-ages has 
yielded very slowly to the proofs of complexity. The stupor of science before radium is  
a proof of it. Yet it is quite sure, according to my score of ratios and curves, that, at the 
accelerated rate of progression shown since 1600, it will not need another century or half 
century to tip thought upside down. Law, in that case, would disappear as theory or a priori 
principle, and give place to force. Morality would become police. Explosives would reach 
cosmic violence. Disintegration would overcome integration. 
(pp. 391–392) 
Adams’ method of quantifying the rise of physical power, like Stuart-Glennie’s 500-year 
cycles, may have been faulty, but, like Stuart-Glennie, it allowed his intuitive powers to make 
startling predictions. The first bomb of “cosmic violence,” the atomic bomb, exploded about 
40 years after Adams’ prediction. 
5. Another major yet unknown contributor, surprisingly, is D. H. Lawrence, whose contribu- 
tion I have discovered and addressed elsewhere (Halton, 2014; 2016), and do not have
the space to discuss here. Lawrence developed an original and critical perspective on the
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